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STUDENT RIGHTS: FROM IN LOCO PARENTIS TO SINE

PARENT/BUS AND BACK AGAIN? UNDERSTANDING
THE FAMILY EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS AND PRIVACY
ACT IN HIGHER EDUCATION

Britton White*

I. INTRODUCTION
During the latter half of the twentieth century, the collegestudent relationship in the United States was in a state of flux.
Student rights have undergone significant changes in America
during the last fifty years. Specifically, the doctrine of in loco
parentis, which started as a good idea of how to treat college
students, was transformed into an outdated dogma against
which young people rebelled during the 1960s. This generation
eagerly wanted to trade the doctrine of in loco parentis, "in
place of the parent," for sine parentibus, "without parents."
However, in recent years, a combination of court decisions and
second-guessing by this very same generation has started the
slow turn of the sine parentibus ship back toward the island of
in loco parentis.
One factor in the transition back towards in loco parentis
has been the passage of the Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act, which deals with the disclosure of student
education records. Although the Act's original purpose was to
protect student rights, that purpose has been significantly
undermined by recent amendments, and the balance of power
has been dramatically shifted from students to their parents,
who are ironically part of the same generation that demanded
independence during the 1960s. Although there has not yet

'Associate, McLocklin, Murphy & Dishman, L.L.P., Winder, Georgia. The bulk of this
paper was written while the author was attending the University of Georgia School of
Law. The author would like to thank Professor Anne P. Dupre and Dr. Ronald G. White
for their insightful suggestions and comments.
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been a full return to in loco parentis, further congressional
amendments to the Act may allow higher education
institutions to have almost absolute power in disclosing
student information, especially to parents. The harmful effects
of such a closely aligned college-parent relationship should
cause legislators to reconsider any further changes to the Act
regarding disclosures of student information. In addition,
legislators should take another look at the exceptions imbedded
within the Act, as the full usage of those provisions may make
additional amendments completely unnecessary.
Part II of the article discusses the historical background of
the doctrine of in loco parentis in the context of higher
education institutions. Part II also discusses the facts
surrounding the passage of the Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act and recent changes in the relationships between
colleges, students, and parents. Part III gives a general
description of the Act and addresses concerns about the Act,
such as what constitutes an education record, and what
remedies are available to injured parties. The section also
discusses the exceptions to the Act, including the disclosure of
documents related to law enforcement unit records, health or
safety emergencies, and disclosures to parents of dependent
students. Part IV provides a discussion of an amendment to the
Act involving the disclosure of student alcohol- and drugrelated incidents to parents. Part V discusses the future of
student rights under the Act and argues that further
amendments to the Act may be unnecessary because other
provisions of the Act, most notably the exceptions discussed in
Part III, could be utilized to fulfill the purposes for which the
recent amendments were enacted.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
This section will address the doctrine of in loco parentis and
its role in three distinct eras in American higher education law.
It will also address a new phenomenon, the increased
involvement of parents in their children's college education
experience. Finally, this section will outline the enactment of
FERPA, the act that has guided the disclosure of educational
records since 197 4.
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A. In Loco Parentis

In order to fully understand the development of federal
privacy regulations in the college-student relationship, it is
helpful to view that relationship in terms of the doctrine of in
loco parentis. 1 In the context of higher education institutions,
in loco parentis means that "college authorities st[an]d in the
place of the parents to the students entrusted to their care." 2
Therefore, these authorities are charged with parents' rights,
duties, and responsibilities regarding their students. 3 The
doctrine of in loco parentis in American colleges and
universities has been one of ebb and flow, 4 and it has often
been a source of confusion among administrators in setting
policy, especially with respect to potential civil liability. 5
The history of in loco parentis in American higher education
can be broken down into three distinct eras. 6 The first era can
be traced from an influential court decision in 1913 up to the
1960s. During this period, the courts gave colleges and
universities a free hand over their students' lives. 7 The second
era extends from the 1960s to the 1980s and was a time of
great student unrest and intense litigation that resulted in a
reversal of in loco parentis. 8 The third era extends from the
1980s to the present and is characterized as a time of changing
legal precedent with regard to student and parental rights. 9

1. The first era: 1913-1960s
The first era began in 1913, when the Kentucky Court of
- - - -

--~---··

-~------

1. In the eontext of higher education, in loco parentis is defined as the
"[s]upervision of a young adult by an administrative body such as a university."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 803 (8th ed. 2004).
2. Brian Jackson, The Lingering Legacy of In Loco Parentis: An Historical
Surucy and Proposal for Reform, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1135, 1136 (1991).
:1. Michael Clay Smith, College Liability Resulting from Campus Crime:
Resurrection for In Loco Parentis?, 59 ED. LAW REP. 1, 4 (1990).
4. See Barbara Jones, In Loco Parentis Reborn: Whitlock v. Univ. of Denver, :i4
En. LAW REP. 995, 995 (1986).
5. See Philip M. Hirshberg, The College's Emerging Duty to Superuise Students:
In Loco Parentis in the 1990s, 46 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 189, 200-02 (1994).
6. See Jackson, supra note 2, at 1136-37; Smith, supra note 3, at 1; Jones, supra
note 4, at 995-96.
7. See Jackson, supra note 2, at 1148.
8. See Smith, supra note 3, at 1.
9. See Jackson, supra note 2, at 1148.

324

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2007

Appeals 10 decided the watershed case of Gott v. Berea
College. 11 Although other cases had previously applied
principles resembling in loco parentis, 12 Gott generally is
viewed as the clearest expression of the doctrine in American
courts. 13 Berea College had promulgated a rule forbidding its
students from patronizing certain businesses not affiliated with
the college. 14 The plaintiff, a local restaurant owner whose
business was adversely affected as a consequence, challenged
the rule. 15 The court was presented with the question of how
much discretion should be given to colleges and universities
when setting rules and regulations for their students. In
dismissing the plaintiffs claims, the court held that:
fclollege authorities stand in loco parentis concerning the
physical and moral welfare, and mental training of the
pupils, and we are unable to see why to that end they
may not make any rule or regulation for the
P"nvPrnmPnt. nr hPttPrmPnt of their pupils that a parent
could for the same purpose. 16
In the wake of Gott, other courts also characterized the
collee-e-student relationshiu as in loco varentis and e-ave strong
deference to college authorities. 17 Throughout this era, a bright
10. This court is now known as the Kentucky Supreme Court.
ll. Gott v. Berea Coil., 161 S.W. 204 (Ky. 191:3).
12. See ,Jones, supra note 4, at 995 (discussing the doctrine of in loco parentis
before 191::l. which is beyond the scope of this paper). ,Jones notes that in Lander l'.
Seaver, :12 Vt. 114 (1859) (although Jones cites the case as an 1S60 case, the case was
actually decided in May of the Hlf>9 term), the Supreme Court of Vermont hl'id that
schools generally treated students as adults regarding all extracurricular behavior
unless that behavior had a "direct and immt'diate effect on the classroom or on the
student-teacher relationship." .Jones, supra note 4, at 995 (quoting K.W. (;orclon, !Juc
Process: A Swing Toward Student Rif.!hls, 12(2) J. C. STUDENT PERSONNEL 95 101
(1971)). But see People ex rei. Pratt v. Wheaton Col! .. 40 Ill. 186. 187 (18GG) (holding
that the judiciary has "no more authority to interfere than [it has] to control the
domestic discipline of a father in his family").
13. Jackson, supra note 2, at 1146.
14. Gott. 161 S.W. at 205.
15. !d.
1G. !d. at 206.
17. See Stetson v. Hunt, 102 So. 6:17, 640 (Fla. 1924) (holding that "collcg<'
authorities stand in loco parentis [to their students] and in their discretion may mak<>
any regulation for their government which a parent could make for the same> purpose"):
Woods v. Simpson, 126 A. 882. 8S:1 (Md. 1924) (stating that college officers "must. of
necessity, be left untrammeled in handling the problems which arise as their judgment
and discretion may dictate"): Ingersoll v. Clapp, 263 1'. 483, 487 (Mont. 1928) (holding
that "courts will not interfere with the discretion of school officials in matte1·s which
the law has conferred to their judgment, unless there is a clear abuse of that
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line existed for administrators in promulgating rules, lH and
students were seldom successful in challene"in!! them in the
courts. 19 The nower of colleges and universities over students
amounted to absolute authoritarian control. 20 In the words of
one scholar, in loco parentis placed "a blanket of security and
insularity around the university culture [under which] the
universitv was free to exercise discinlinarv nower - - or not
with wide discretion and little concern for litigation." 21

2. The second era: 1960s - 1980s
The doctrine of in loco parentis began to fade during the
controversial events of the 1960s, when colleges and
universities were perhaps the most galvanizing areas for
radical change. Students became much more assertive about
their rights, 22 often storming administration buildings on
campuses to demand the elimination of dress codes, dorm
hours, and other rules that seemed to hinder general social
reform. 23 One commentator wrote:
After I graduated in 1966, the pendulum began to swing the
other way. If young people could be sent to Vietnam to die for
their country, it was said, they also should be able to vote and
buy a beer. In the early 70's, many states lowered the
drinking age; 18-year-olds got the right to vote. On college
campuses, in loco parentis became sine parentibus-without
parents. Dorm supervisors disappeared, along with their signout sheets, and dorms became coed. Gone also were classattendance records, required course work, and, on some

discrl'tion''): Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 2:31 N.Y.S. 4:3ii, 440 (NY. App. Div. 1928)
(noting that university authorities have wide discretion in determining disciplinary
rules. and courts will be hesitant to disturb any decision in that respect).
Pl. See Gott, 161 S.W. at 206 (holding that any rule or regulation would be upheld
unless unlawful or against public policy). But sec id. (stating in dictum that less
deference would be given to public colleges and universities than to private
institutions) (inte>mal reference omitted).
HJ. ,Jackson, supra note 2, at 1141-l.
20. Id.
21. Joel C. Epstein. Higher Education Center, Parental Notification: Fact or
Fiction (Oct. 6. 1999), http://www.edc.org/hec/pubs/articles/parentalnotification.html
(quoting ROBERT D. BICKEL & PETER F. LAKE, TilE Rr<;HTS AND RESPONS!ll!LITIES OF
THE MODERN UNIVEI<SITY: WHO ASSUMES THE RISKS OF COLLEGE LIF";? (1999)).
22. Jom·s. supra note 4, at 996.
2:1. Helen E. .Johnson. Rducating Parents About College Ufr. CHRO:\. HfGHER
Enuc ..•Jan. 9, 2004. at Bll.
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campuses, even grades. 24

The traditional doctrine of in loco parentis inevitably
yielded to expanded concepts of individual liberties for college
students. 2 5 Furthermore, the role of the university
administrator evolved from one of setting strict limits in order
to maintain authoritarian control to one of helping students
find opportunities to mature as adults. 26
In addition to students viewing themselves as emancipated
from their former surrogate parents, the courts also began to
recogmze students as adults. 27 One of the first cases to
announce the demise of in loco parentis in public higher
education institutions was Dixon v. Alabama State Board of
Education. 28 At issue in Dixon were the procedural due process
rights of students who were expelled for participating in civil
rights demonstrations. 29 The court ruled in favor of the
students, holding that the United States Constitution required
the school to provide them with notice and an opportunity to be
heard before expelling them. 30 More importantly, the court
made a distinct shift from the judicial tradition of giving strong
deference to college authorities, which Gott and its progeny had
established years before. 31 During the years following Dixon,
other courts began to join the trend of abolishing in loco
parentis in higher education institutions. 32 Furthermore, the

24. Claire L. Gaudiani, The Cold War is Ouer Between the Generations. C!lllON.
HIGHER EDUC., May 20, 1992.
25. Smith, supra note :1, at 1.
26. See Jones, supra note 4, at 996.
27. ld.
28. Dixon v. Ala. State I3d. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 19fi 1). For an analysis
of the repudiation of in loco parentis in elementary and secondary schools, which is
beyond the scope of this paper, compare Dixon with New .krsey u. T.L.O .. 469 U.S. :125.
a:16 (1985) (finding the doctrine of in loco parentis to be ''in tension with contemporary
reality and the teachings of th[e] Court"). But sec Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47.J v. Acton, 515
U.S. 646, 654 (1995) (noting that the nature of a school's power over schoolchildren is
"custodial and tutelary," and "that for many purposes school administrators act in loco
parentis") (internal reference omitted). See generally Anne P. Dupre, Should Students
Haue Constitutional Rights~ Keeping Order in the Public Schools, 65 GEO. WASil. L.
REV. 49, 80 n.234 (1996) (detailing numerous sources discussing the demisp of in loco
parentis in elementary and secondary education).
29. Dixon, 294 F.2d at 151-52.
30. Id. at 158-59.
31. See Jackson, supra note 2, at 1149-50.
32. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169. 189-90 (1972) (holding that although
a college may have a legitimate interest in preventing disruption. the college has the
burden of proving that a denial of recognition of a student organization was justified):
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Twenty-Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
was ratified in 1971, giving all citizens eighteen years of age
and older the right to vote. :33 A general consensus had
developed that college-age young people indeed were adults,
and that perhaps sine parentibus was a more suitable goal for
university-student relations than in loco parentis.

3. The third era: 1980s -present
As individual liberties of students expanded during the
second era, civil liability of colleges and universities to their
students was marginalized. 34 The abrogation of in loco parentis
in decisions such as Bradshaw v. Rawlings substantially
limited a college's duty to protect its students. 35 Beginning in
the 1980s, however, this trend of limiting the civil liability of
colleges and universities began to reverse as many appellate
courts started to recognize such a duty in response to rapid
increases of criminal activity on college campuses. 36 During
this era, courts fashioned new rules of liability that are similar
to those of the landlord-tenant relationship. 37 Colleges and
universities could now be liable to a student for damages
resulting from campus criminal activity because they are in a
special relationship with that student; therefore, the college is
expected to take protective steps or give adequate warnings in
order to prevent its students from becoming victims of crime. 38
Central to the issue of liability in this line of cases was
whether the criminal activity was foreseeable to the college. 39

BradHhaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 140 (:3d Cir. 1979) (holding that colleges "no
longer control the broad arena of general morals," and that students now "vigorously
claim the right to define and regulate their own lives"): Buttney v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp.
280, 286 (D. Colo. 1968) (holding that "the doctrine of 'In Loco Parentis' is no longer
tenable in a university community").
:3:3. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
34. See Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 138 (noting that "the modern American college is
not an insurer of the safety of its students").
:35. See Hirshberg, supra note 5, at 191.
:16. !d. at 191.
:11. See Smith. supra note :3, at 1~2.
38. !d. at 2.
39. See Jesik v. Maricopa County Cmty. Col!., 611 P.2d 547, 550~51 (Ariz. 1980)
(holding that the college had a duty to protect a student from foreseeable criminal
harm where the student had been previously threatened by another student and
reported the threats to a campus security guard); Peterson v. San Francisco Cmty. Col!.
Dist.. 685 P.2d 119:1, 1194~95 (Cal. 1984) (holding that the college owed a duty to warn
the student of danger where the college authorities were aware of previous assaults
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For example, the victim in Miller v. State was a nineteen-yearold female student who was attacked in the laundry room of
her dormitory by an unidentified assailant. 40 She was forced
upstairs where she was raped twice at knifepoint. 41 In deciding
whether to find a duty to protect, the court examined evidence
such as reports of general dormitory crimes including burglary,
armed robbery, and rape. 42 Furthermore, the victim had made
prior complaints about this specific dormitory having problems
with male nonresidents loitering in the hallways and
restrooms, yet all of the dormitory's doors remained unlocked. 4 :3
The court found that these facts were sufficient to make such
an attack foreseeable, and thus it recognized a duty of the
school to protect its students from such events. 44
As the 1990s arrived, some courts began to expand this
duty to include protecting students from their own reckless
behavior and that of their fellow students. 45 In Furek v.
University of Delaware, a student was severely burned during a
hazing incident at a fraternity house on campus. 46 The
Delaware Supreme Court found that the student's status as a
business invitee created a duty on the part of the university to
protect the student from hazing activities. 47 The court also
relied upon several facts tending to indicate that the incident
was foreseeable including these primary findings: (1) the
university had voluntarily assumed a duty to monitor

and rape attempts in a particular parking lot); Mullins v. Pine Manor Coli .. 449 N.E.2d
:l:n. :l:15-:l() (Mass. 198:1) (holding that a reasonable> expectation L·xish that
"reasonable care will be exPrcised to protect resident students from foreseeable harm");
Relyea v. State. :385 So. 2d 137il. l:l82-8:) (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. HJSO) (holding that
although a duty to protect could arise from the parties' relationship as landowner and
invitet>. thco criminal acts had to have bcoen rcoasonably foreseeablt>. as covidenced b:v·
adual or constructive knowledge of prior, similar crimes); Mill<~r v. State. 467 N.E.2d
49:3 ..HJ7 (0!.Y. 1984) (holding that the colh•ge owed the student a dut:v· of maintaining
minimal security measures in a dormitory, and that the assault and rape of the student
was fo1·eseeable).
40. Miller. 4(j7 N.K2d at 494.
41. Jd.

42. Id. at 4%.
4:l. Id.
44. !d. at 497.
45. Hirshberg, supra note 5, at 191.
4fi. Fun•k v. Univ. of Del.. ;)94 A.2d 5()(). 509--10 (Del. 1991 ).
47. lei. at 520-22. ThP court also noted that while the univ(•rsity did not own the
fraternity house. it owned the land on which the house was located. which furthn
evidenced its control ovcor thP situation. !d. at 522.
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fraternities in order to eliminate hazing, (2) "activities
preceding fraternity hazing" were observed by campus security
and it was "common knowledge on campus that hazing
occurred," and (3) there were past incidents of hazing at this
particular fraternity house. 4 8
An even broader duty to protect students from their own
behavior has been recognized in some cases. 49 In Pitre v.
Louisiana Tech University, 50 a student was permanently
disabled in a sledding accident on campus. 51 The court held
that the residential status of the student created a special
relationship between him and the university, and consequently
the university owed a duty to correct or warn him of
foreseeable and unreasonable danger. 52 The court found that
the university knew of the danger presented by sledding at this
particular site, and thus held that this incident was
foreseeable. 5 ;1
Some commentators have posited that this third era is more
likely the substantive remnant of a merely stylistic demise of
in loco parentis rather than a rebirth of the traditional
doctrine. 54 Others have argued that in loco parentis is making
a strong comeback as many universities have reinstated
dormitory rules, imposed quiet hours, and regulated when men

48. Id. at :)21--22. Although the holding in Furek followt)d the general trend of the
third era lJ,- expanding the university's duty to protect, the court made an interesting
rt>ference to tlw demisP of in loco parentis. It stated that "although the University no
longer stands in loco pat·entis to its students, the relationship is sufficiently close and
direct to impose a duty . . ." ld. at 522. The court continued by adding that the
"university is not an insurer of the safety of its students nor a policeman of student
morality. noneth<>less. it has a duty to regulate and supervise foreseeable dangerous
activities occurring on its property," including "negligent or intentional activities of
third persons." Jd.
49. Hirshberg, supra note G, at 191.
50. Pitre v. La. Tech Univ., 596 So. 2d 1324 (La. Ct. App. 19H2).
51. Id. at l:l:l2.
52. Id. at 1:J:r~-:l:L
5:3. !d. at 1:1:1:1.
54. Sec ,Jackson. supra note 2, at 1137 (asserting that the doctrine of in loco
parentis continues to intluc>nce the legal status and polices of modern American
universities). According to .Jackson, "despite repeated judicial assurances that in loco
parentis was doctrinally inadequate, student litigants still rarely prevail in suits
against universities," "[t[hl~ new contractual and constitutional analysis applied to
student-university disputes is problematic," "[t]he state action doctrine ... cannot be
employed in a privat" context," and "the continuing debate over hate speech rules on
American campuses further illustrates an institutional reluctance to relinquish rigid
parental control.'' Jd.
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and women may visit each others' rooms in an attempt to
"rerun[] the 50s." 55 In response to pressure from potential
lawsuits, some universities have reinstituted policies of not
serving alcohol on campus or banning beer in kegs. 56 The court
in Mullins v. Pine Manor College attempted to reconcile the
decline of in loco parentis with the growing trend of higher
education institutions' duty to protect by stating, "The fact that
a college need not police the morals of its resident students ...
does not entitle it to abandon any effort to ensure their
physical safety." 57 The court added that "[p]arents, students,
and the general community still have a reasonable expectation,
fostered in part by colleges themselves, that reasonable care
will be exercised to protect resident students from foreseeable
harm." 58 Still, confusion exists concerning the doctrine of in
loco parentis due to the absence of an unequivocal statement by
the United States Supreme Court repudiating the doctrine in
higher education institutions. 5 9 Now it may be too late, as more
evidence of a return to in loco parentis accumulates.

B. Parental Involvement: A New Trend
Evidence of a return to in loco parentis, as manifest in
recent changes in the college-student relationship, may be
being prompted by a new trend of parental involvement. In
stark contrast to the tumultuous times of the 1960s and 1970s,

55. Gaudiani, supra note 24 (noting that one such major institution to implement
these changes was Boston University).
5o. Id. See also What Campuses and Communities Arc Doinf.{. Higher Education
Center (2004), available at http://www.edc.org/heclideasamplers/#limiting. Institutions
choosing to limit alcohol availability or ban alcohol altogether include Duke Uniwrsity.
Lehigh University, University of Colorado-Boulder, University of Delaware, University
of Iowa, and the University of Rhode Island. Other schools simply restricting the
marketing and promotion of alcohol on campus include Baylor University. Stanford
University, Texas A & M University, and the University of Minnesota. Id.
57. Mullins v. Pine Manor Coli.. 449 N.E.2d :331. 335-Cl6 (Mass. 198:3).
58. ld. at :l:36.
59. After all, the Court has not decided a case analogous to New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. :325 (1985) in its repudiation of in loco parentis in elementary and secondary
education. See supra note 28. See generally Dupre, supra note 28, at 70 n.145 (listing
sources discussing the dispute about the current status of in loco parentis in higher
education). Perhaps the Court believed that a statement repudiating in loco parentis in
higher education would be unnecessary. If elementary and secondary schools no longer
stand in place of the parent to schoolchildren, a fortiori colleges and universities
certainly should not be charged with all the rights and responsibilities of parents over
young adults.
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programs for parents have been springing up at colleges and
universities across the nation to "encourage parents to become
enmeshed ... with their childrens' lives on campus." 60 Scholars
have suggested that a significant reason for these changes is
that members of the baby boomer generation, who as college
students fought for increased student rights in the 1960s and
1970s, have been sending their children off to college and now
are lobbying for increased parental rights. 61 A common
characteristic of the increase in parental involvement is when
parents actively take on problems that their children should be
handling on their own. 62
As colleges and universities struggle to deal with the
evolution of the university-student and university-parent
relationships, federal regulations exist that make matters even
more complex. In response to regulatory uncertainties, some
institutions have encouraged parents to become more
enmeshed in their children's lives in college; 63 however, this
response may be ill conceived as it could lead to entangling
relationships "in which there are unclear boundaries and an
unhealthy sense of dependence." 64 Such a "family" approach
"encourages excessive attachments, misplaced expectations,
and inappropriate assumptions of authority."6 5 Instead, higher
education institutions should take a closer look at the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act in order to understand
better the ideal working relationship between students,
universities, and parents.
C.

Legislation

On May 14, 1974, Congress passed the statute that would
later become known as the Family Educational Rights and

60. See .Johnson, supra note 2::l.
61. See id.
62. ld. ,Johnson notes some examples of extreme parental involvement including a
mother calling the university to demand twenty-four-hour technical computer support
for students after her daughter lost a term paper during the night that was due the
next morning, a father who took leave from his job to assist his son in the college
application process, a mother who shouted at an admissions officer after her child was
denied admission, and a parent who f1ew across the country to argue with a professor
who had given her son his first "B" in a course. Id.
63. See id.
64. Id.

65. Id.
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Privacy Act of 1974, or FERPA ("the Act"). 66 The Act was
originally known as the Buckley Amendment, offered by the
senator of the same name, 67 and was a floor amendment to
other federal education legislation. 68
Although a mere amendment, the passage of the Buckley
Amendment was perhaps the most significant congressional
response to the abrogation of in loco parentis. Today, the Act
attempts to "enhance[e] student achievement through greater
parent involvement in their children's education." 69 Generally,
the Act "protects the privacy interests of parents and students
with regard to education records." 70 It requires that parents of
students be allowed to inspect and review education records of
their children, 71 and that they be provided with an opportunity
for a hearing to challenge records that they believe to be
inaccurate or misleading. 72 The Act also prohibits the release
of such records to third parties without the prior written
consent of the student's parents. 73
------~~~----------~~-

()6. Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 9:3-:380, 88 Stat. 571. amended by
Buckley Amendment, Pub. L. No. 93-568, § 2(a)-(b). 88 Stat.18F>8-1862 (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. § 12:i2g (2000)). Ser Margaret L. O'DonnelL FERPA: Only a
Piece of the Privacy Puzzle, 29 ,J.C. & U.L. 679, 681 (200:3).
67. Pub. L. No. 93-568, 88 Stat. at 18fi8. ,James Lan<~ BucklPy s<erved as United
States Senator from New York from 1971--77.
68. Lynn M. Daggett, Bucking Up Buckley I: Makint; the Federal Student Records
Statute Work, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 617, 617 (1997).
G9. Icl. at G22.
70. MICHAEL MEDARIS, ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, SHARI:--!<: lNFOR:VL\TI0:--1: A
GUIDE TO THE FAMILY EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS AND PRIVACY ACT AN!l PAI\TICIPATION I;\J
JUVENILI·; ,JUSTICE PIWGRAMS ;3 (1997).
71. See 20 U.S. C. § 1232g(a)(1)(A). The; Act states in part:
No funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any educational
agency or institution which has a policy of denying, or which effectively prewnts. the
parents of students who are or have been in attendance at. a school of such agency or at
such institution, as the case may be, the right to inspect and review the education
records of their children. !d.
72. See id. § 1232g(a)(2). The Act states in part:
No funds shall be made available under any applicabl<' program to any educational
agency or institution unless the parents of students who are or have hPPn in
attendance at a school of such agency or at such institution an• provided an
opportunity for a hearing by such agency or institution, in accordance with regulations
of the Secretary. to challenge the content of such student's education records, in order
to insure that the records are not inaccurate, misleading, or otherwise in violation of
the privacy rights of students, and to provide an opportunity for the correction or
deletion of any such inaccurate. misleading or otherwise inappropriatP data contained
therein and to insert into such records a written explanation of the parents respecting
the cont<,nt of such records. !d.
7:l. See id. § 12:l2g(b)(l). The Act states in part:
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The Act applies to any public or private agency or
institution that is the recipient of federal funds, 74 including
elementary, secondary, and higher education institutions. 75
Because federal student financial aid funds are included within
the scope of the Act, it may regulate private and even nonprofit institutions as long as they are channeling those funds to
their students. 76 The Act was passed pursuant to Congress'
spending power, 77 which means that it "operates as a condition
on the receipt of federal education funding, rather than a direct
mandate." 78 Thus, an agency or institution that systematically
violates the Act is subject to withdrawal of all federal funds, 79
even if only one part of the agency is receiving funds when the
violations occur. 80
According to Senator Buckley, the purpose of the Act was to
remedy the increasing abuse of student records through
assuring parents' and students' access to those records while
protecting their privacy. 81 Although the Act contains no preface
or statement of purpose, 82 Senator Buckley made the following
statement regarding his motives behind sponsoring the bill:
More fundamentally, my :in:itiatio~ of this legislation rests on
my belief that the protection of individual privacy is essential
to the continued existence of a free society. There has been
clear evidence of frequent, even systematic violations of the
privacy of students and parents by the schools through the
unauthorized collection of sensitive personal information and
the unauthorized, inappropriate release of personal data to
various individuals and organizations. In addition, the growth

No funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any educational
agenc:-· or institution which has a policy or practice of permitting the release of
education records (or personall:-· identifiable information contained therein oth<•J· than
directory information. as defined in paragraph (5) of subsection (a) of this section) of
students without the written consent of their parents to any individual, agency, or
organization .... ld.
7 4. I d. § 1232g(a)(3).
7;). Daggett. supra note GH. at 622-2:\. To the c>xtent that tlw Act applies to
elementar:-· and secondary institutions, it is beyond the scope of this article.
7G. Sec Medaris. supra note 70, app. at A-2.
77. !:'icc U.S. Cor-;sT. art. I. ~ H.
7H. Daggett. supm note GH. at 620.
79. Lynn M. Daggett, Bucking Up Hu.chlcy 11: Using Civil Rights Claims to
Enforce the Federal8tudent Records 8tatu.te, 21 SEATTLI•: U. L. REV. 29, 41 (1997).
f\0. See Daggdt, supra not" (1H, at 62:1.
Hl. hi. at G2~.
i-12. ld.
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of the use of computer data banks on students and individuals
in general has threatened to tear away most of the few
remaining veils guarding personal privacy, and to place
enormous, dangerous power in the hands of the government,
as well as private organizations. 8 3
One particular example of privacy abuse that concerned
Senator Buckley was the widespread practice of issuing
surveys to elementary and secondary students without the
permission of their parents. 84 This practice became even more
troubling when the students' parents were denied access to
those surveys. 85
The origin of the Act's application to higher education
institutions is rather anomalous. According to one scholar, it
was not Senator Buckley's intention to include colleges and
universities among the regulated agencies and institutions. 86
Apparently, the inclusion of higher education institutions in
the Buckley Amendment was the result of a drafting error. 87
Nevertheless, "for more than [thirty] years, [the Act] and its
regulations have comprehensively, and in great detail,
governed [the handling of] student records" in the realm of
higher education.ss
III. FERPA As APPLIED IN HIGHER EDUCATION
Generally, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
(FERPA) prohibits the release of education records to third
parties without the prior written consent of the student's
parents. 89 In the context of higher education, the Act classifies
a student who is at least eighteen years old as an "eligible

83. O'Donnell, supra note 66, at 681 (quoting 121 Cong. Re~. Slil, 991 (daily ed.
May 13, 1975) (statement of Sen. Buckley)).
84. !d. at 682. These surveys contained questions that were quite intrusive.
including whether the child's parents told him they loved him, if the ~hild had thoughts
of running away from home, and whether the child had committed certain crimes in
the past. !d. What parti~ularly disturbed Senator Buckley, a fi,rvent supporter of
federalism. was the use of federal funds to conduct the surveys. According to O'Donnell.
it was in this sense that "[his] support for federalism could coexist pea~efully with his
support for privacy." Icl. at 68:3.
85. See id. at 682.
86. !d. at 68:~.
87. !d.
88. See Daggett, supra note 68, at 617.
89. See supra note 7:l and accompanying text.
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student," and thus the parents' rights under the Act are
transferred to the student.9° The Act defines "education record"
as "those records, files, documents, and other materials which
contain information directly related to a student; and are
maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a
person acting for such agency or institution." 91 One challenge
for colleges and universities is the identification of what may
be classified as an education record for purposes of the Act.
A. What Is an Education Record?
Since the passage of FERPA, many institutions have
struggled with determining whether or not school disciplinary
records are "education records" within the meaning of the Act.
When litigation has arisen on this issue, the results have been
far from uniform. 92 For example, the Georgia Supreme Court
held in 1993 that university disciplinary records were not
"education records" as defined by the Act and thus were
available to the public pursuant to state open records acts. 93
On the other hand, a lower court in Louisiana held that similar
records were confidential despite any state open records laws. 94
Recent litigation out of the Sixth Circuit has caught many
college officials' attention. After the Ohio Supreme Court ruled
in 1997 that records from campus disciplinary proceedings
were not protected education records, 95 the United States
Department of Education weighed in on the debate. 96 The

90. See 20 U.S.C. ~ 12:l2g(d) (2000). The Act states in part:
For the purposes of this sPction, whenever a student has attained eighteen years of
age, or is attending an institution of postsecondary education, the permission or
consent required of and the rights accorded to the pan;nts of the student shall
thereafter only be required of and accorded to the student. ld.
See also Medaris, supra note 70, at 3. For purposes of this article, the term "students"
will refer to "eligible students" within the meaning of the Act, due to the fact that most
college students are at least eighteen years of age.
91. § J2:32g(a)( 4 )(;\).
92. See Dennis GrPgory, Campus Discipline us. Criminal dustice, CIIRON. HIGHER
EDUC .. Apr. 27, 1994.
9:3. See Red & Black Publ'g Co. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga .. 427 S.E.2d
257. 261-62 (Ga. 199:1).
94. Gregory. supra note• 92.
95. State ex. rei. Miami Student v. Miami Univ .. 680 N.E.2d 9ii6. 9ii8 (Ohio 1997).
The Ohio Supreme Court relied on Red & Black Publishing Co. in reaching its decision.
lei. at 958-59.
96. Kit Lively, U.S. l~ducation Department and Ohio Supreme Court Differ on
Crime Reports, CHHON. HIUIIEI( EllUC., Sept. 5, 1997.
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Department warned Ohio colleges that they may be violating
federal law by complying with the court's ruling to disclose the
records. 97 The same parties eventually ended up in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, where the court
ruled that the disciplinary records in question were indeed
education records.98
Another open records dispute arose in United States v.
11iiami University 99 out of a factual situation not unlike many
disputes involving campus newspapers that emerged during
the 1990s. Editors of a student newspaper at Miami University
made a written request pursuant to a state open records act for
student disciplinary records in order to write a report on crime
trends. 100 The university officials initially resisted, but did
release the records, after redacting some information, when the
editors made a written request pursuant to the Ohio Public
Records Act. 101 The editors then appealed to the Ohio Supreme
Court, and the court, upon finding no federal privacy
violations, ordered the officials to turn over the records. 102
The Unites States brought an action on behalf of the
Department of Education seeking an injunction against the
university. 103 The district court disagreed with the Ohio
Supreme Court and found that the disciplinary records were
education records that should not be disclosed. 104 On appeal to
the Sixth Circuit, the court affirmed the decision of the district
court and held that under a plain language interpretation of
the Act, "student disciplinary records are education records
because they directly relate to a student and are kept by that
student's university."l05
Upon reviewing the express statutory exemptions from
pnvacy and the exceptions to the definition of "education

97. Id.
9H. Ben Gose, Court Says Colleges Can't Release Files from Student .Judicial
Proceedings, CHRON. HIGHE!{ EDUC., ,July 12, 2002, at A24.
(J9. UnitPd StatPs v. Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797 (6th Cir. 2002).
lOO. ld. at H03.
101. Id. (The university redacted the identity, sex, and age of the individuals. as
well as the date. time, and location of the offenses which lPd to the disciplinar:-·
charges).
102. Id. (The comt allowed the university to redact the name, social st·curit~·
numlwr. or student J.D. numhcr of the individuals).
JO:l. ld. at H04.
104. Id. at H04-0il.
lOfi. ld. at. H12.
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records," the court concluded that Congress intended to include
disciplinary records within the meaning of education
records. 106 The court placed great emphasis on the provisions
in 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (b)(6) of the Act. 107 This section allows
institutions of higher education to disclose the results of
disciplinary hearings against students who are alleged
perpetrators to any victim of a violent crime or a non-forcible
sex offense. 108 The Act also allows disclosure of the results of
such proceedings to the general public if the school determines
that the student in question violated the institution's rules and
regulations with respect to the offense. 109
The court reasoned that Congress began with the
assumption that all student disciplinary records are education
records. 11 Congress then selected two particular situations,
crimes of violence and non-forcible sex offenses, where other
countervailing interests outweigh the student's privacy rights
so that otherwise protected records may be disclosed. 111
Congress was careful, however, to limit the amount of
information disclosed under this section.l 12 All § 1232g (b)(6)
disclosures must include "only the name of the student, the
violation committed, and any sanction imposed by the
institution on that student; and may include the name of any
other student, such as a victim or witness, only with the
written consent of that other student." 11 3
The court also noted yet another section of the Act that
allows disclosure of disciplinary records only in specific
circumstances. 114 The Act allows institutions to include

°

106. !d.
107. !d.
lOS. 20 U.S.C. § 12:J2g(b)(6)(A) (2000). In early 2005. Congress considered an
amendnwnt to the Act that would have madt> a § 1232g(b)(6)(A) disclosure mandatory
ratht>r than permissive. The amendment would have also allowed the next of kin of the
alleged victim to be treated as the victim for purposes of this section if the alleged
victim is deceased. See H.R. 81, 109th Cong. (2005). The last major action on the hill
involved referral to the House Subcommittee on 21st Century Competitiveness. Library
of Congress, THOMAS: Search Results: H.R. 81 Summary and Status,
http:/ It homas.loc.gov/cgi -bin/bdqueryJD?d 109:1: ./temp/-bdS7ZR:Ca!~,j~I)X/hss/ 109
search.ht mi.
109. 20 U.S.C. § 12:12g(b)(6)(B).
110. Miami Univ., 294 F.:od at 812.
Ill. /d. at 812-1:1.
112. Sec id. at Sl:l.
I J:l. § 12:12g(b)(6)(C)

1 H. See Miami Uniu., 294 F. 3d at 81:3.
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information in a student's education record concerning
disciplinary action taken against such student for conduct that
posed "a significant risk to the safety or well-being of that
student, or other students, or other members of the school
community." 115 It also allows institutions to disclose such
information "to teachers and school officials, including teachers
and school officials in other schools, who have legitimate
educational interests in the behavior of the student." 11 6 The
court again conducted a textual analysis of this section of the
Act and concluded that Congress intended for the student's
privacy interest in disciplinary records to be protected but
carved out an exception for disclosures to specific people and
involving certain conduct.117
The Miami University decision was embraced by college
officials, many of whom believe that campus disciplinary
proceedings should remain private because punishments are
educational rather than criminaP 18 On the other hand,
student-press advocates argue that in the wake of the decision,
colleges will develop new policies of urging students to report
all incidents, especially those that may bring embarrassment,
to the institution and campus officials rather than to police.l 19

B. Remedies for Violations
If an institution fails to disclose information or discloses
information it should not have disclosed, there are legal
remedies available to the injured party. The Act operates as a
condition on the receipt of federal funding, and institutions
that systematically violate the Act are subject to sanctions from
the United States Department of Education through the
Family Policy Compliance Office whereby federal funding is
removed. 120 According to the Family Policy Compliance Office,
which administers the Act for the United States Department of
Education, no college has ever been sanctioned under the law,

116.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
§ 1232g(h).
See Miami Uniu., 294 F. 3d at 813.
Gose. supra note 98.
Id.
See Daggett, supra note 79, at 41.
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but students and their families are free to complain to the
Education Department in the hope that it will investigate.l 21
Some students and their families have felt that these
possible sanctions are inadequate and have argued that a
private cause of action should be recognized by the courts as an
additional way to enforce the Act. 122 Many attempts have been
made through the years to create such a private cause of action
under the Act, but they have generally met stiff resistance in
the courts. 123 Another possibility for aggrieved parties has
been to argue that violations of the Act create a federal civil
rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 124 Public colleges and
universities are subject to causes of action under § 1983 if the
plaintiff proves the requisite elements. 125 The central question
is whether§ 1983 claims apply to grievances under the Act.
The most important case involving federal civil rights
claims under the Act against higher education institutions is
Gonzaga University v. Doe. 126 In that case, the United States
Supreme Court was presented squarely with the question of
whether a student may sue a private university for damages
under § 1983 to enforce provisions of the Act. 12 7 The plaintiff in
the case was a former student at the university in the
undergraduate school of education. 128 Upon graduation, he had
planned to teach at a state public elementary school, which
required that he obtain an affidavit of good moral character

121. Michael Arnone. Cunf.{ress Weighs Changes in Key Student-Privacy f~a.t<',
CI!IW:-.i. HH:Him Enuc., Oct. :1, 2003, at A22.
122. Sec Daggett, supra note 79, at 41.
123. Sec id. at 42.
124. See id. at 4f>.
125. Sec generally id. at 4fi-48 (describing in detail who may he sued under§ 19H:l.
n•quired ekments to make out a prima facie case, possible defenses available to such
actions. and types of remedies available).
126. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 27:3 (2002). See O'Donnell, supra note 66. at
6!18.

127. Gonzaga. fi:)fi U.S. at 276. The author notes that Gonzaga University is a
pt·ivate university and as such is generally exempt from § 1983 claims-regardless of
whether they receive federal funds, private institutions do not act under color of state
law. which is an element of making out a prima facie§ 1983 claim. See supra note 121)
and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the Court's holding in Gonzaga University was
not necessarily limited to questions involving actions against private institutions, but
made a broader statement in general about using § 198:3 claims to enforce the Act. The
Court assumed without deciding that the university acted under color of state law
whpn it disclosed the information in question to state officials. See Gonzaf.{a, 536 U.S.
at 277 n.l.
128. Gonzaga, fi:o6 U.S. at 277.
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from the dean of the school of education. 12 9 Before the plaintiff
could receive the affidavit, a teacher certification specialist at
Gonzaga learned of possible prior sexual misconduct involving
the plaintiff and informed the state agency that was
responsible for teacher certification. 1:3° However, no criminal
charges were ever brought against the plaintiff for the alleged
misconduct. l:3l After he was denied the affidavit, he sued the
university and the specialist under § 1983 "for the release of
confidential personal information to an 'unauthorized person'
in violation of' the Act.l::l2
The Court noted that state and federal courts had divided
sharply on the issue of§ 1983's applicability to the Act and that
the lower courts' decisions in this particular case were in stark
contrast to each other. 1:3:3 Eager to resolve this issue, the Court
unequivocally held that § 1983 cannot be used to enforce
violations of the Act. 1:34 Chief Justice Rehnquist, the author of
the majority opinion, wrote the following statement:
Respondent contends that this statutory regime confers upon
any student enrolled at a covered school or institution a
federal right, enforceable in suits for damages under § 1983,
not to have "education records" disclosed to unauthorized
persons without the student's express written consent. But we
have never before held, and decline to do so here, that
spending legislation drafted in terms resembling those of
FERPA can confer enforceable rights. 1:3 5

The Court noted that while § 1983 actions may be brought
to enforce rights created by federal statutes, it must be clear
and unambiguous that Congress intended to confer individual
rights in order to enforce federal funding legislation through §
1983. 1:l6 It is particularly important to note that current Chief

129.
l:lO.
1:n.
1:32.

!d.

/d.
Arnone, .supra note 121.
Gonzaga, ii::l6 U.S. at 277.
1:J::l. !d. at 27/l. After the jury awardpd the plaintiff over $1 million in damages. the
state court of appeals ruled that the Act could not be enforced under§ 19H:i. ld. at 2777i3. The state supreme court reversed and ordered the damage award to hP reinstat<ed,
reasoning that the Act's nondisclosure' provisions gave rise to a federal right
enforceable under§ 19H3. ld.
l:i4. !d. at 279.
J:J5. !d.
1:16. /d. at 2HO. The Court described two such cast~s where it had recognized
enforceable rights under spending legislation. In Wright u. Roanoke Redevelopment and
Housing Authority. 479 U.S. 418 (1987). the Court "allowed a~ 19H:J suit by tenanh to
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Justice John G. Roberts represented Gonzaga University before
the Court in this case. 1:'l? Another lawyf~r representing Gonzaga
made the statement, "[B]y the time [Roberts] argued the case
he knew more Ferpa law than most higher-education
lawyers." 1:38 His knowledge may help direct the Court should it
decide to take a FERPA case in the future.
Congress quickly responded to Gonzaga University by
considering a bill 1:19 that would have modified the Act to
provide parents and students with the right to sue institutions
for releasing information that ends up harming the student. 14 0
Many college officials were opposed to the bill, arguing that it
would open up their institutions to frivolous lawsuits and cost
them money either through litigation costs or settlements
entered into to avoid negative publicity. 141 Proponents
responded that few privacy violations result in actual harm to
students, and most institutions already go to great lengths to
be careful about privacy. 142 Nevertheless, Congress has yet to
pass such an amendment giving individuals enforceable rights
under the Act. 148

C. Exceptions
Although the Act generally requires that an institution
obtain the eligible student's prior consent before making

recovl·r past overcharges under a rent-ct•iling provision of the Public Housing Act."
Similarly. in Wilder u. Virl{inia Hospital Assn., 496 U.S. 498 (1990). the Court allowed
a lj 19/n suit by health care providers to enforce a reimbursement provision of the
Medicaid Act. Gonzaga, 5:36 U.S. at 280.
1:l7. Sara Lipka, Bush Nominee for Hiuh Court Knows Colleges, CHR0:-.1. H ICHER
EllliC .. ,July 29. 200!J. at AI.
1:l8. I d. Whill' one could argue that tlw Court may n'verse its position in tlw future
on ~ 198:3 claims regarding the Act, Gonzaua Uniucrsity will lilwly remain good law
now that Roberts has taken the place of the late Chief ,Justice Rchnquist on the Court.
1:l9. H .H. 18<1:-l. 108th Con g. (200:3). availa/J/c at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/querv/z0cl0:-l:II.R.1848.1H:. The bill was introduced in the Housl' on April 29. 2008
during the fit·st ,;cssion of the 108th Congress by Rep. Robert E. Andrews (D- N,J). See
Arnon''· supra note 121.
HO. Arnone. supra note 121.
141. ld.
H2. ld.
14:l. The last major action on the bill involved referral to the House Subcommittee
on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property on June 2!l, 2003. Library of
Congress, THOMAS: Sl'arch Results:
H.R.
1H48 Summary and Status,
http:l!thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z'?dl08:HR01848:(a'(u(iiX. No similar bills have
been proposed tu date.
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disclosures to third parties, several statutory exceptions exist
that allow the institution to disclose without student consent
and without fear of civil liability. 144 These exceptions include
records maintained by a law enforcement unit of the
educational agency that are created for a law enforcement
purpose, 145 disclosures in connection with a health or safety
emergency, 146 and disclosures to parents of a dependent
student as defined by the Internal Revenue Code. 147

1. Law enforcement unit records
The law enforcement unit records exception was adopted
specifically for colleges and universities in order to deal with
campus police records. 148 A law enforcement unit may include
any "individual, office, department, division, or other
component of a school or school district ... that is officially
authorized or designated by the school district to (1) enforce
any Federal, State, or local law, or (2) maintain the physical
security and safety of schools in the district." 149 Records that
are "maintained by a law enforcement unit of the educational
agency or institution that were created by that law
enforcement unit for the purpose of law enforcement" are not
considered education records within the meaning of the Act. 100
Institutions may disclose information from these records to any
third party, including federal, state, or local authorities, social
service agencies, and even the media. 151 In addition, statutes

144. See 20 U.S.C. § 12:l2g(b)(1). See also Mcdaris, supra note 70, at 4-i"i (listing all
of the statutory c•xceptions where prior consent is not rc>quirPd in order to clisclos<·.
most of which are beyond the scope of this paper).
14i"i. § 1232g(a)(4)(B). The Act also provides other exemptions from tlw education
record definition that are beyond the scope of this paper. These include records of
instructional, supervisory. and administrative personnel that are in the soh• possession
of the author of those records and not accessible to any other person, records that relate
exclusively to employees of the educational agency in the normal course of busim'ss and
in the employee's capacity as such, and records of students maintained by a physician,
psychiatrist. psychologist, or other professional that are used in connection with tht>
treatment of the student. I d.
146. § 12:i2g(b)(1)(I).
147. § 1232g(b)(1)(H).
148. See Daggett, supra note 68, at 627. However, this exception also applies to
elementary and secondary education institutions. !d.
149. Medaris, supra note 70, at 5.
150. 20 U.S.C. § 12:i2g(a)(4)(B)(ii).
151. Medaris, supra note 70, at 5.
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exist in some states that may require institutions to provide
public access to these records.152
While the statutory definition of law enforcement unit
records may seem simplistic, it contains various nuances that
should be noted. If the records are not created for a law
enforcement purpose, the Act will protect their disclosure
regardless of whether a law enforcement unit possesses
them. 15 :3 In addition, unlike other provisions of the Act, if a law
enforcement unit shares copies of valid law enforcement
records with another component of the school, the records do
not lose their status as such. 154 However, the copy that the law
enforcement unit shares with the other officials becomes an
education record within the meaning of the Act once that
official receives and maintains it. 155 This can be particularly
confusing with respect to school disciplinary proceedings. 156
The original record still in possession of the law enforcement
unit remains a non-education record within the meaning of the
Act and readily disclosable to third parties while the copies of
the records and any records of a subsequent disciplinary
proceeding held by other college officials are protected from
disclosure by the Act.157

2. Health or safety emergencies
Unlike the law enforcement unit records exception, which
allows disclosure of non-education records, the health or safety
emergencies exception allows institutions to disclose otherwise
protected education records 158 to appropriate persons in
connection with an emergency "if the knowledge of such
information is necessary to protect the health and safety of the
student or other persons .... " 159 This provisiOn 1s "a
152. ld.
15:l. See id. at 6.
154. See id.: see also Daggett, supra note 68, at 627. Daggett describes other
statutory exceptions in the Act as relating to "sole possession notes," meaning they are
neither accessible to nor actually accessed by anyone other than the particular
institutional component in possession of the records. Once the records are accessed by
another component, they lose their status as sole possession notes and become Buckley
records. Id. at 626.
15fi. Medaris, supra note 70, at 6.
1fi6. See supra pt. III(A).
157. See Medaris, supra note 70, at 6.
1fiS. See id. at 7.
1fiH. 20 U.S.C. 12:l2g(b)(1)(l) (2000).
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commonsense acknowledgement that there may be situations
when the immediate need for information to avert or diffuse
certain unusual conditions or disruptions requires the release
of information." 16° The Act requires that this provision be
interpreted narrowly. 161 Examples of such immediate need
could include disruptions that involve serious criminal conduct
such as weapons-related activity, and it is immaterial whether
the location of the incident is on campus or not as long as the
crisis affects the school campus or the public health and
safety. 162

3. Disclosure to parents of dependent students
Another situation where an institution may disclose
otherwise protected education records is when the disclosure is
made to the parent or parents of a dependent student as
defined by the Internal Revenue Code. 163 Until recently,
however, most colleges have been confused by this exception or
have found it too difficult to determine which students are
"financially dependent" within the meaning of the Code. 164
These institutions have erred on the side of caution for fear of
violating the Act. 165 This confusion puts colleges and
universities in a delicate position: by choosing to disclose
information to the student's parents, they run the risk of
violating the Act's general requirements of nondisclosure of
education records; by choosing not to disclose the information,
they may be exposing themselves to potential tort liability to
the parents if something goes terribly wrong, for example,
serious harm to a student that the parents claim could have
been avoided by disclosure of an education record.

IV. AN AMENDMENT: ALCOHOL AND DIWG-RELi\TED INCIDENTS
In response to widespread confusion about disclosures to

I (iO. Medaris. supra nott~ 70, at 7.
Hil. .Sec id.: sec also Dag-gett. supra note GH. at G:l? n.14ii (noting that "a student's
non-urgent medical condition and associated safety concPrns arP not enwrgencic·s
justifying- sharing- records with the student's doctor without prior consent").
1 ti2. Medaris. c;upra note 70, at 7.
Hi:\. ~ 1232g(h)(l )(H).
]()4. Leo Rt•isherg. \Vhen a Student /Jrin/,·s Illcgal/y, Should Colleges Cull !Vlolll
and !Jadr. CHHO:--J. HI<:IIER EJJUC .. Dec. 4, 1998, at A:19.
l(iCi. Sec id.
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parents and the increase in lawsuits filed by parents against
schools for alcohol and drug related incidents involving their
children, Congress amended the Act in 1998 through revisions
to the Higher Education Act 166 to allow institutions to inform
parents any time a student under the age of twenty-one
violates drug or alcohol laws, without running afoul of the
Act. Hi/ This has been seen as a major shift because "since the
demise of in loco parentis in the 1960s, colleges and
universities have recognized that even freshmen are legal
adults once they turn 18, and administrators have thus
contacted parents only when drinking episodes lead to death or
serious injury." 168
Under the 1998 amendment, however, permissible
disclosures include not only violations of any federal, state, or
local law but also school rules and regulations governing the
use or possession of drugs and alcohol as long as the school
determines that the student violated those school rules and
regu lations. 169 In adopting such policies, institutions should
note that the amendment does not impose any affirmative
obligation on the school to inform parents of violations. Instead,
the parental notification amendment simply gives institutions
discretion to disclose without running the risk of violating the
Act. 110 Institutions are not required to tell the student that
they have notified their parents of the violation, but they must

](i(i. Highe1· Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 10Pi-244. §§ 951-9G2. 112
Stat 18:l:). 1s:l6. Other federal statutes have amended the Act. in other areas. Sec e.g ..
Kelly Fi<·ld. /{ducation /)cpartment Considers Revisions in Privacy-Law Regulations.
Ufficiol So_vs, CHRON. Hl<:lllm EJJUC., Apr. i-l, 2005, at A21 (dPscribing how a 2000
anwndnwnt. allows institutions to disclose information they receive from state officials
on stwl<-nt.s who are regist.en'd sex offenders without the student's permission).
l (i7. 20 U.S.C. ~ 12:l2g(i)(l) (2000); see also Reisberg, supra note 164.
I (i8 !leis berg. supra note 164.
Hi H. ~ 12:)2g(i)( 1). The Act states in part:
Nothing in this Act ... shall be construed to prohibit an institution of higher education
from disclosing, to a parent. or legal guardian of a student, information regarding any
violation of any Federal, State, or local law, or of any rule or policy of the institution,
governing the use or possession of alcohol or a controlled substance. regardless of
whethr·r that information io contained in the student's education records. if._
(r\) thl' student is undpr the age of 21: and
(B) the institution determines that the student has committed a disciplinary violation
with n·sp<·<·t to such use or possession. !d.
Sec also l•:pstein, supra note 21.
170. Sec 1232g(i)(1); see also Field, supra note 166 (stating that colleges can otill
"refusL' to release information to the parents of a student who is a dependent").
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provide a record of the disclosure to the student if he or she
requests such information. 1 71
The alcohol and drug amendment allows institutions to
notify parents whenever an underage student violates the law
or school rules regarding alcohol or drugs. This has the effect of
increasing an institution's possible liability to parents because
Congress has now deferred to the schools on whether to
disclose while giving them a "safe-harbor" from possible
violations of the Act. 172 Institutions that choose not to disclose
have almost no defense to parents' lawsuits against them
because the Act now readily invites disclosure of this kind of
behavior to parents. Administrators who realized this quickly
created their own safe-harbors by establishing parental
notification policies or amending existing policies to allow more
liberal disclosure to parents. Essentially, institutions can now
insulate themselves from liability to parents by erring on the
side of disclosure. 17:3
Under these new rules, many institutions are adopting
parental notification policies in order to limit their liability
under the Act. 174 The University of Delaware was one of the
first institutions to implement a parental notification policy for
drug and alcohol violations, and several other schools have
been paying close attention to see how it fares. 175 During the
first full year of the policy, the university sent home over 1,000
letters to parents of students who violated alcohol or drug

1/'J. Stevpn Burel. Colleges Allowed to Tell Parents Abou.t Alcohol Use. C!I!W:\.
HIGHI<:Il ]';OU(: .. ,July 14.2000. atA:11.

172. Of course. an institution's liability will depend on the facts of each case•. For
purposes of this argument, a useful hypothetical scenario involves an institution that
has notice of prior alcohol or drug incidents and fails to inform the student's parPnts.
Subsequently. the student dies or is seriously harmed as a result of this behavior and
the parents sue the institution for negligently failing to notify them.
17:i. This is a significant shift from the Act's original purpose because Senator
Buckley arguably would have had institutions err on the side of nondisclosure.
174. See Epstein, supra note 21. Epstein notes that the University of Delaware,
Virginia Tech. American University, and George Washington University are sc•veral
institutions that have either adopted a parental notification policy or are considering
doing so. Radford University in Virginia was the first to adopt such a policy, d<''ng so
even prior to the amendments to the federal laws. In fact, Radford's parental
notification policy was largely responsible for the new amendment. The father of a
Radford student killed in an alcohol-related car crash was instrumental in lobbying for
the changes. Id.
175. Reisherg, supra note 164.
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rules. 176 Citing the new policy, University of Delaware officials
have noticed a substantial decline in the students' recidivism
rate for these offenses.177
Similarly, the University of Georgia's parental notification
policy recently changed after a January 2006 incident in which
a university freshman died in a dormitory from a mixture of
alcohol and drugs. 178 Although the policy before 2006 only
notified parents concerning situations involving egregious
alcohol abuse or repeat offense, the policies for the 2006-07
year require parental notification after just one alcohol or drug
violation, including mere possession of alcohol by an underage
student, upon the satisfaction of certain conditions. 179
Although both Delaware and Georgia have changed their
policies, officials at other institutions doubt the practicality of
enforcing such new policies and argue that because the
amendment requires the school to adjudicate the student in
violation of their rules and regulations before telling his or her
parents, nothing short of catching students in the act of
drinking or using drugs will provide the requisite evidence to
make such an adjudication. 180 In addition, some college
officials are worried that the amendment may actually increase
the potential for liability to parents. 181 The parental
notification amendment gives large amounts of discretion to
college authorities because now it is up to them to choose
whether to disclose or not. Before the amendment was passed,
institutions could simply defer to the Act and the paramount

176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See Danee Attebury, Student Found Dead in Russell HaLl Dorm, RED &
DL,\l'K (Univ. of Ga.), .Jan. 2:\, 200(), available at http://media.www.redandblack.com/
media/storage/paperH71/news/2006/0 1/23/News/Student.Found. Dead.! n. Russcll.Hall.D
orm-2569446.shtml; Dance Attebury, Fish Dead from Mixture of Heroin, Cocaine, and
Alcohol, RED & BLACK (Univ. of Ga.), Feb. 2, 2006, available at http://media.www.
redandblack.com/media/storage/paperH71/news/2006/02/02/ News/Fish-Dead.From.
Mixture.Of.Heroin.Cocaine.And.Alcohol-2569574.shtml: see also Rebecca K. Quigley,
New Alcohol and Dru!J Policies Passed, ATHE:-.!S BANNER-HEI\ALil (Ga.), Apr. 27, 2006,
at Al.
179. See Quigley. supra note 178; see also U:-.!IV. OF GA., COllE OF CO:\DUCT 6
(2005 ). available at http://www. uga.edu/judicialprograms/2005-06"o20Code"~o20of'\o
20Conduct.pdf. The conditions include circumstances such as: significant property
damage occurred as a result of the violation, medical attention was required, and
others.
180. See Epstein, supra note 21.
181. See Reisherg, supra note 164.
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interest of protecting students' privacy rights when sued by
parents for failing to inform them of their children's conduct.
Today, institutions may appear much more culpable in
lawsuits if it can be shown that they knew of prior instances of
violations and faced no risk of running afoul of federal privacy
laws by disclosing to the parents. The natural result of this
effect will be a substantial increase in parental notification
policies at colleges and universities across the nation. and a
trend toward
liberalizing already-existing
notification
182
policies.
Indeed, policy changes at the University of
Delaware and University of Georgia are prime examples of the
trend in higher education institutions during the last several
years.
If the trend continues, perhaps the Act will be amended to
allow disclosure upon the mere suspicion of alcohol or drug
violations. In order to avoid liability, institutions inevitably
would be forced to respond by mandating parental notification
under these speculative circumstances. The end result of this
perpetual follow-the-leader approach is nothing short of in loco
parentis in higher education where institutions act as a
student's parent away from home.

V. THE FUTURE OF STUDENT RIGHTS UNDER THE ACT
In light of the recent amendments to the Act, for example,
the amendment concerning alcohol and drug related incidents,
it appears that the exceptions now are beginning to swallow
the rule. The general rule of nondisclosure of student records
has been eroded so much that there are almost as many
circumstances where disclosure is permissible as there are
circumstances where it is prohibited. What is most alarming is
that these changes may be wholly unnecessary and could lead
to systematic disclosure policies that could spiral out of control
at the expense of student rights. Thus, the current alcohol and
drug provision should be reconsidered. Rather than amend the
Act to allow more and more disclosures, legislators and
institutions should strive to find a healthy balance in some of
the already existing provisions of the Act. The exceptions
allowing disclosures for law enforcement unit records, health or
safety emergencies, and dependent students should be utilized
182. See Quigley. supra note 178.
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to the fullest extent rather than merely overlooked as too
narrow or unworkable.
For example, it is not beyond reason that the health or
safety emergency exception could be used to notify parents if
their child is caught abusing alcohol or drugs. Although the
abuse would probably have to rise to a considerable level in
order to take advantage of this provision of the Act, certainly
parents could be considered "appropriate persons" within the
meaning of this provision because they are in the best position
to protect their child from reckless behavior.
In addition, the law enforcement unit records exception
could be used to notify parents of any alcohol or drug use as
long as the law enforcement unit makes that disclosure from
records that were originally created for a law enforcement
purpose. As noted previously, these are not "education records"
within the meaning of the Act, and thus the Act does not even
apply to law enforcement unit records. School officials should
have working relationships with campus law enforcement so
that the law enforcement unit may develop policies for
notifying parents whenever students get into trouble for
alcohol or drug violations. Institutions such as the University
of Georgia could still address the growing concerns of alcohol
and drug abuse by having strict notification policies that are a
function of the law enforcement unit records exception.
Presumably, if an underage student even possesses alcohol, he
is in violation of the institution's rules of conduct and can be
charged by the law enforcement unit of the institution. Any
records kept as a result of that incident are not "education
records" within the meaning of the Act and are therefore
readily available for disclosure to that student's parents.
Furthermore, the dependent student exception is perhaps
the best opportunity to disclose information to parents about
alcohol or drug use. It acts as a "catch all" provision to include
any disclosures as long as that student is financially dependent
on the parents. It is inexcusable that institutions are ignoring
this exception merely because the Internal Hevenue Code is too
difficult to understand. This provision has been used for years
by some colleges and universities in making such disclosures to
parents lll:l and best demonstrates that further amendments to
the Act in this respect would be unnecessary.
1 H:l. See

]{,.i~herg,

supra note 164.
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While this article argues that the Act should not be
amended to further erode students' rights, the arguments made
by parents for more rights at the expense of their children are
not without merit. After all, the true purpose of the Act is not
to cut off parents and treat them as mere third parties
regarding student records. Surely, parents retain some rights
with respect to their college-age children. Armed with highdamage jury verdicts, these parents will readily challenge
institutions that choose not to inform them of their students'
misconduct when it results in those students' harm. Between
institutions of higher education and parents, the latter
probably is in the best position to rectify the destructive
behavior of students. 184 These arguments clearly cut toward
giving parents more rights and marginalizing the application of
the Act's general provisions to them.

VI. CONCLUSION
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act presents
constant challenges for higher education institutions regarding
disclosures of student information. The traditional doctrine of
in loco parentis has undergone major changes with respect to
these institutions, and this helps to explain why some amount
of uncertainty exists about how the Act should apply to them.
The Act's general rule of nondisclosure has been eroded
through amendments allowing disclosure in certain situations
or to specific parties. Some of those amendments, however, may
be seen as superfluous because the Act contains provisions that
are readily available to solve some of the same problems that
the changes were originally intended to rectify. Rather than
broaden the discretion of higher education institutions, which
inevitably leads to increased disclosures in order to avoid
liability (i.e., a return to in loco parentis), the Act should be
utilized to its fullest potential so that a healthy balance may be
achieved between those institutions' interests and students'
privacy rights.

11-l-1. ~'or example. thP most common sc<mario may involve the parent simply
withdrawing the student from school if the behavior does not changP.

